English translation by TigerDyne Nexus. The Korean original is authoritative.
Visiting MSPO in Kielce, Poland, and AUSA in Washington back to back, I confirmed that the international defense market is moving in a similar direction. The two exhibitions differ in scale and character. Yet the question I kept running into at both venues was, in the end, a single one: who will supply the needed equipment on time, who will keep that equipment running locally, and who will also guarantee control over data and technology.
MSPO can no longer be described simply as a regional exhibition for Central and Eastern Europe. The 2026 exhibition drew 1,209 companies from 43 countries, 45,000 visitors, and 58 official delegations from 43 countries. The organizers rate MSPO as the third-largest defense exhibition in Europe, but the mood I felt on site went beyond simple equipment showcases. Security anxiety on Europe's eastern front, the lessons of the war in Ukraine, procurement delays, and demands for local production and maintenance capacity were the core topics for companies, governments and military officials.
The reason Poland stands at the center of this change is also clear. According to NATO's 2025 figures, Poland's defense spending is at the level of 4.48% of gross domestic product (GDP), showing a very high will to invest in defense even within the alliance. At the 2025 Hague summit, NATO agreed to allocate 5% of GDP by 2035 to core defense and defense- and security-related investment. Of this, at least 3.5% is to go to core defense requirements and up to 1.5% to critical infrastructure, resilience, innovation and strengthening the defense industrial base. Europe's rearmament has become not a passing mood but a long-term task of rebuilding everything from production capacity, ammunition, air defense and manpower to logistics systems.
MSPO showed what that long-term task demands. Buyer countries no longer want 'one good piece of equipment'. They demand, as a single package, not only rapid initial delivery but also local maintenance (MRO), parts inventories, training of maintenance personnel, electronics and software upgrades, wartime resupply and participation by their own industry. The European Union, too, through Readiness 2030, has set out air and missile defense, drones and counter-drone, cyber, AI and electronic warfare, artillery, ground combat, and ammunition and missiles as priority capability areas, emphasizing joint procurement and expanded production capacity. Today's European market is changing from a simple purchasing market into a market looking for industrial partners who will share responsibility for the readiness rate of its forces.
AUSA in Washington showed the same change from a different angle. AUSA is an exhibition centered on the US Army, but by the organizers' count for 2026 it is a gathering place for a global ground-forces and defense network, with more than 40,000 participants, more than 750 exhibits and representatives from more than 100 countries. What mattered there was not only the size of the platforms on display. Unmanned systems, counter-drone, electronic warfare, sensors, AI-based command and control (C2), autonomy, and the supply chains and industrial base that support them emerged as the core agenda. If MSPO poses the practical question of 'what can be deployed to Europe's eastern front, and how quickly', AUSA was asking 'through what data, software and industrial ecosystem will that capability be sustained and developed'.
The message the two exhibitions send to Korea's defense industry is clear. Korea's competitiveness lies in excellent manufacturing capability, competitive prices and relatively fast delivery. It is in the same context that Poland's Ministry of National Defence, in announcing its 2022 contracts with Korea for K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers and FA-50 aircraft, emphasized rapid delivery together with Polish industrial participation and local production. Korea's defense industry has already built trust in the European market as 'a supplier that can deliver when needed'. Now it must develop that trust into the status of 'a partner that operates, repairs and upgrades together, on site'.
First, Korea–Poland cooperation must move from platform-export cooperation to life-cycle cooperation. For systems such as the K2, K9, FA-50 and Chunmoo, managing readiness over the following 20 to 30 years matters more than the initial delivery. Maintenance centers, parts depots, education and training systems, upgrade authority and test and evaluation capacity in Poland must be combined step by step. This will speed up Poland's fielding of capabilities and create a sustainable services and upgrade market for Korean companies.
Second, counter-drone warfare capabilities must be added on top of existing platforms. The war in Ukraine did not show that the era of tanks and artillery is over. Rather, it showed that tanks and artillery can hardly survive unless they are connected with drones, electronic warfare, sensors and air defense systems. Projects that integrate small-drone detection, radio-frequency detection and jamming, interceptors, AI-based threat prioritization and tactical C2 into the K2, K9 and ground command posts are the most realistic tasks Korea and Poland can pursue together. When Poland's experience in operating unmanned systems is combined with Korea's electronics, sensor and mass-production capabilities, the result can be a combat-ready solution rather than a single piece of equipment.
Third, Korea must design 'alliance-based autonomy' into its cooperation with the United States as well. This does not mean keeping a distance from the United States. Rather, it means making use of US technology, interoperability and market access while securing key data, cryptography, maintenance authority and software-update authority at the contract and system-design stage. Entry into the US market, too, should not aim only at head-on competition with finished products. It is more realistic to select and concentrate on fields that can actually strengthen the US defense industrial base, such as shipbuilding, components, electronic equipment, maintenance, supply-chain restoration and workforce development.
Fourth, the door to cooperation must open both ways. A structure is needed in which Korea introduces and demonstrates Poland's unmanned systems, software, and test and training capabilities in suitable areas, and Poland combines Korea's platforms with its production and electronics technology. Trust for joint development emerges only when we move beyond the simple division between 'exporting country' and 'importing country'. That trust can in turn lead to a foundation for cooperation in NATO interoperability, joint entry into third countries in Europe, and new markets such as the Middle East and Africa.
Korea's choice is clear in the end. An export model that competes on price and delivery alone is valid as a starting point, but it cannot be the destination. Korean-style international defense cooperation must bind equipment, logistics, software, data, people and local industry into a single capability package. That is precisely the change that MSPO in Kielce and AUSA in Washington revealed. The question K-defense must ask from now on is not 'what more will we sell'. It is 'with whom will we build what capability, and who will operate that capability for 30 years'. The export of a single piece of equipment ends with the contract, but a system of joint operation, maintenance and upgrades builds strategic trust between nations.
Colonel (Ret.) KIM Yong-sun is a security, defense and defense-industry expert. He has served as defense attaché to NATO and the EU and as defense logistics attaché to the United States.