On a single day, 15 September, one meeting produced two decisions that pointed in opposite directions. The 178th Defense Project Promotion Committee of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) voted to acquire a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle, a KRW 2.16 trillion program, through domestic research and development. At the same session it decided to procure the Maritime Operations Helicopter-II, a KRW 3.24 trillion program, as a foreign purchase of Lockheed Martin's MH-60R Seahawk from the United States. One would be built; the other would be bought. Some read this as inconsistency. I see it differently. This split is not a contradiction but a signal of where our military stands today.
Different Answers from the Same Military in the Same Year
Both programs went through due process. For the UAV, the pre-concept study was conducted again, some required operational capabilities were re-examined, and the feasibility of domestic development was reconfirmed. The program starts from removing the take-off and landing constraints of the fixed-wing division-level reconnaissance UAV. For the helicopter, the type was chosen on the basis of purchase test and evaluation and negotiation results. The Maritime Operations Helicopter-II embarks on destroyers and frigates to hunt submarines and surface ships, and will replace the aging Lynx fleet with some 20 aircraft by 2032. What deserves attention is the lineage of outcomes. In the first maritime helicopter program the Navy chose Europe's Wildcat, in the second the Seahawk, and this time it is bringing in the same type again. Following the 12 aircraft secured in the second program, it adds some 20 more — the third consecutive foreign purchase. It is not that there was no attempt at localization in between. In 2016 a domestic manufacturer put forward a maritime operations helicopter based on the Surion at the Paris show, but the government did not accept it, citing that the airframe had been developed for land use, so its center of gravity was unstable and there were safety issues when the main rotor was handled manually. For the UAV, by contrast, the judgment that domestic development was feasible was upheld. The same military gave different answers in the same year.
What Divided Them Was Timing, Not Will
My judgment is that it was not will that divided the two programs. It was the maturity of the technology and the point at which we entered it. Rotary-wing maritime platforms are a field built up over more than half a century, and the price of entering late and trying to catch up is simply too high. Nor is the decision to buy anything to be ashamed of. The Seahawk's multi-mode radar and low-frequency dipping sonar are capabilities our ships need right now, and getting them into our hands on time is also part of defending the force. UAVs are different. The standards have not yet hardened, and we climbed onto that curve in time. In this mountainous land, where a division's eyes could not open because it could not find a runway, the VTOL UAV removes that constraint. Its surveillance performance is more than four times that of the existing division-level reconnaissance UAV, and those eyes do not rest — not only in wartime operations but also in peacetime vigilance. The program begins in 2027 and ends in 2036. Ten years is the time it takes an officer to grow from platoon leader to battalion commander, and it means filling that time with our own technology. Anyone who has served in the field knows the weight of what it means for a commander to see the battlefield with their own eyes rather than borrowing someone else's. That is the return on a curve boarded in time.
Choosing the Next Curve
The question we must ask now, then, is clear: where is the next curve opening? Autonomous flight, counter-drone, and manned-unmanned teaming are the candidates. Whichever it is, if we do not climb on now, twenty years from now we will once again be explaining a decision to buy. What to build and what to buy is not a question of patriotism but a question of timing. We must therefore set the criteria that define that timing, and keep a record of those criteria and how they were applied so that they can be verified. Making today's decisions explainable twenty years from now — that is the most reliable capability we can hand down to the next generation of commanders.